O "backdoor" should be understood as referring not to "easily spotted" malicious modifications in the actual Tor code as published by TP, but in other elements involved in the interaction between Tor clients, Tor nodes, and the wider Internet environment, such as psuedorandom number generators, TLS, PKI certificates, "benign" CDNs, "benign" anti-DDOS platforms "protecting" (?) TP and other NGOs from attack, etc., O one of the most important lessons from the Snowden leaks is that, far from being too paranoid, most of us are probably insufficiently paranoid- and yet, we need to somehow prevent paranoia from destroying our good judgment or causing us to fall into passive despair (which is exactly the state which governments of USA, RU, CN etc want to place their domestic dissidents, so our despair would be their victory), O judgments about the safest course of action must always take account of the local and global political situation, including the best current information about plausible political and legal as well as technical threats, O technology alone cannot keep anyone safe, Some key points I think we need to always bear in mind:
It is difficult to know, and the best answer on day n might be a bad answer on day n+1, so we all need to spend time reviewing what we think we know about who are enemies are and what their methods are. Jayp, IMO pastly's response is inadequate and possibly dangerously misleading.įWIW, I think your fears may be well founded, and thus it may make sense to hit "new identity", or even to reboot Tails after visiting a site likely to be surveilled, maybe implanted with NSA/FBI/CA malware.
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